ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, VALUE DIVERSITY AND SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL AUTHORITIES

MEBS KANJI¹*
¹Department of Political Science, Concordia University, 1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd West, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
* Corresponding Author : Mebs.Kanji@concordia.ca

Received : 30-08-2011     Accepted : 28-09-2011     Published : 05-12-2011
Volume : 2     Issue : 2       Pages : 92 - 107
Int J Econ Bus Model 2.2 (2011):92-107

Conflict of Interest : None declared

As evidence demonstrates that various structural and lifestyle changes resulting from the transition from industrialism to post industrialism have been transforming the value mix of advanced industrial societies, there are reasons to suppose that more developed states may contain higher levels of value diversity and that this may have implications for political support. Using the World Values Surveys (1981-2000) I examine whether variations in economic development are associated with differences in value diversity, as well as whether higher levels of value diversity are linked to lower levels of support for people in government.

values, political support, economic development, value diversity, generational change, postmaterialism, value change, intergenerational differences.

Evidence shows that various structural and lifestyle changes resulting from the transition from agrarianism to industrialism to postindustrialism can affect the value mix in advanced industrial societies [1-6] .
As a result, there are reasons to suppose that more developed states may contain greater degrees of value diversity than less developed societies. I believe that such transformations may be elevating the level of intra-societal stress within advanced industrial states and making governing more difficult [7] . As a consequence, I also suspect that political support within these societies may be adversely affected.
For the sake of clarity, it is important to emphasize that publics can and do distinguish between different levels of a regime, and that political support can range in focus from quite specific objects, such as political authorities (or people in politics and government) and regime institutions, to more diffuse support for regime principles and entire political communities. This theoretical framework originates from the pioneering work of Easton [7] and has been further expanded, tested and modified by Pippa Norris [8] and various others [ e.g., 9-11 ].
My focus in this preliminary analysis is on specific political support and particularly on support for political authorities.
More specifically, my main aims in this investigation are to examine whether more developed societies contain higher degrees of value diversity than less developed states, and to test whether higher degrees of value diversity are linked to lower levels of support for people in government.

Most explanations provided for variations in political support stem primarily from one of two camps – performance based theories and culture change theories. The former, as Dalton [11] describes, attempt to attribute declining levels of political support to negative outlooks toward government, or regime performance:
If government performance falls below expectations we might think that specific support for political authorities will suffer as a consequence. If these patterns continue for an extended period of time, the decline of support may generalize to broader evaluations of the regime and the political community. (p. 63)
Culture change theories, on the other hand, typically suggest that certain societal transformations, which are often sparked through economic development, may lead to a more sustained and profound shift in public outlooks toward the workings of a political regime and this too could have negative implications for support for people in government.
While it is certainly reasonable to assume that from time to time citizens in various advanced industrial states may withdraw their support for government institutions or elected officials at least partly for performance related reasons, “coincidental unique political crises across a large and diverse set of nations is an improbable explanation of general patterns; it is more likely that some systematic forces are changing the relationship between citizens and the state in advanced industrial democracies” [11:p.4; see also 10].
In this respect, culture change theories would seem to provide a more fruitful avenue of inquiry in that they attempt to account for cross-national variations in political support through empirically substantiated generalizable explanations pertaining to societal and cultural change. One well known variant of this group of theories, for example, contends that because economic development brings with it a growing emphasis on human emancipation and self-expression [19,20] citizens in advanced industrial societies are less likely to be respectful of hierarchical authority structures [21-23] . As a consequence, some have concluded that citizens in more developed societies may in fact be more outwardly critical of their politicians and political institutions [8] . More to the point, this line of research suggests that in more developed societies a widespread decline in deference may be partly responsible for depressing levels of political support.
Another prominent variant of the culture change argument suggests that an inter-generational erosion of interpersonal trust, brought about by declining levels of participation in social and other organizational group activities and a growing fascination with the new technologies that come avail with increased economic development, may also contribute to lower levels of political support in advanced industrial states [24-26] . The logic of this argument rests on the premise that trusting citizens in well-connected societies are less likely to be guarded against the free rider problem [27] and more likely to both reciprocate on matters of collective action and feel compelled by the collective decision-making process. As a consequence, the chances are greater that the political processes in these societies will run more smoothly and efficiently. And citizens will be more inclined to express greater confidence in their elected officials and to evaluate government institutions more positively than their counterparts in societies with lower levels of interpersonal trust and weaker social networks.
Of course, even though they may be more generalizable than performance based theories, it is unlikely that these particular variants of the culture change argument account entirely for cross-national variations in political support. More specifically, I believe that there is still a great deal about how economic development contributes to the evolution of cultural differences between developed and less developed states that we have yet to fully comprehend.
For instance, evidence indicates that various structural and lifestyle changes resulting from the transition from agrarianism to industrialism to late industrialism have been transforming the value mix in advanced industrial states [1-6] . As a result, there are reasons to suppose that the degree of value diversity between citizens in more developed societies may be greater than in less developed societies. This process may also be important to examine because it might be gradually contributing to the expansion of various new value divides and reshaping traditional cleavage structures within advanced industrial states. Moreover, because cleavage structures define competing interests, it is possible that increased value diversity within advanced industrial states may be elevating the level of intra-societal stress within these societies and making it more difficult for governments to consider and respond to public concerns [7] . This too may be adding to the growing complexity of governing in more developed societies and contributing to lower levels of political support.
For a more specific example, consider Inglehart’s [21,28,29] theory of modernization and postmodernization. Inglehart contends that the increased economic security and education levels that accrue in a society over the phases of modernization and postmodernization contribute to an inter-generational shift in the value priorities of mass publics. Because younger generations in postindustrial societies are socialized in environments that are more secure financially, and because they tend to be more highly educated, their values toward several aspects of life, including politics, economics, work, family life, religion and sexual behavior are likely to differ from those of older generations who were raised during periods of greater economic scarcity and with lower levels of education. The implication of Inglehart’s argument is that the value orientations of younger generations in postindustrial societies may be gradually diverging from those of older cohorts. And because values are likely to play a prominent role in shaping people’s policy demands and political preferences [30] I believe that this may be one example of a new value divide that might contribute to the formation of a new cleavage that could become increasingly salient over time.
Environmental degradation is just one example of a contemporary policy issue that may be fuelled in part by an expanding generational value divide, with younger generations being increasingly preoccupied with the importance of sustainability, more so at least than generations past. Furthermore, analyses conducted in many advanced industrial states indicate that when new issues are tossed onto the political agenda, either by younger generations or others, it creates an amalgamation of traditional policy concerns and new policy debates that makes it more difficult for governments to reconcile the issue preferences of different groups and to satisfy a broad coalition of citizens. More importantly, “the development of new dimensions of political competition creates the potential for citizens to feel their expectations are unfulfilled, which may generalize into an erosion of political support” [11] . As a result, it is quite plausible that citizens in more developed and value diverse societies may feel increasingly frustrated with the political process and particularly their political authorities, as people in government, at least initially, are the most likely to be blamed. But is this the case? What does the evidence suggest? To examine these propositions, let’s turn now to the empirical evidence.

The data that I draw on for this investigation come from The World Values Surveys (WVS). The WVS are ideal for this analysis for several reasons, but two are particularly relevant. First, the comparable nature of this cross-national data source makes it possible for us to conduct a fairly extensive systematic analysis across a wide number of agrarian, industrial, and postindustrial states. To be sure, matching data are not always available for every country included in the data set. In situations such as these, my approach has been simply to maximize the full potential of these data whenever possible, even if it means incorporating certain societies into parts of our analysis, but not into others.
Second, the WVS contain a vast and diverse array of indicators to analyze, including multiple measures of political support and a variable that focuses specifically on people’s satisfaction with the way that political authorities are handling their country’s affairs. The WVS also make it possible to identify and indirectly examine values across a fairly extensive range of domains, something that is not always possible with other more dedicated surveys. And with the WVS, we can conduct detailed comparisons across different subgroups, such as younger and older generations, by boosting sample sizes with the use of pooled data from different countries and time points.

The major obstacle confronted when conducting this type of analysis is that values are extremely tricky to get at directly because they are embedded in what people say, in how they think and in how they act. Thus, similar to the approach employed by our European counterparts [31] , I too began with a basic assumption, which is simply that people’s value orientations serve as an underlying mechanism for structuring their attitudes, beliefs and behaviours across a variety of contexts and circumstances. Given this understanding, I then turned to identify and indirectly operationalize a sample of value orientations via an examination of the underlying structure of people’s responses to the WVS questionnaire [Table-1] .
As a preliminary point of departure, I decided to focus broadly on the most generic and diverse collection of value orientations that I could compare across multiple societies with varying levels of economic development. The findings summarized in [Table-1] report the results of an exploratory factor analysis based on a sample of agrarian, industrial, and postindustrial publics and 53 of the most comparable indicators contained in the WVS. On the whole, the results of this analysis suggest that regardless of the societies in which people live, they generally structure their outlooks toward religion, morals and ethics, economics and technological progress, work, family and various postmodern concerns in fairly systematic ways, which we contend is most likely a reflection of their complex value systems.
For instance, indicators tapping different religious orientations cluster into what appear to be three distinct value patterns. The first unites basic outlooks toward religiosity, which probably reflects people’s most general values toward religion. The second focuses more specifically on the adequacy of church leadership on a variety of issues. This finding suggests that people likely differentiate their values toward religious institutions from their basic values toward religion and that the two need not be connected or consistent. The third deals with the notion of an afterlife including the belief in life after death and whether people have a soul, and beliefs in hell and heaven. This dimension appears as though it may be a useful proxy for spiritual values.
Similarly, under the domain of moral and ethical values, the moral permissiveness factor combines personal outlooks toward abortion, divorce, homosexuality, prostitution, euthanasia and suicide to provide an approximation of people’s personal moral values. And the civil permissiveness dimension unites outlooks toward public misconduct, including behaviours such as claiming government benefits to which people are not entitled, avoiding a fare on public transport, accepting a bribe and cheating on taxes, to represent values toward public misconduct.
A third set of orientations pertains to values toward economic and technological progress. The first dimension brings together orientations toward competition and privatization to represent values toward the core principles of market economics. The second combines orientations toward technology development and scientific advancement to tap values toward science and technology.
Indicators measuring orientations toward work cluster into four separate factors. The first represents values toward workplace conditions through assessments of a variety of job related features such as work hours, vacation time, the amount of pressure involved and pay. The second gauges values toward worker participation based on people’s impressions about following instructions at work and employee involvement in workplace decision-making. A third dimension – workplace motivations – captures the extent to which people value various intrinsic work motivations such as initiative, achievement, responsibility, and the opportunity to use ability. And lastly, the fourth dimension taps values toward money and work more broadly by assessing their relative importance in future life.
The family domain also contains multiple value patterns. The first taps orientations toward dual family incomes and working mom/child relations to represent values toward women and work. The second assesses views toward teaching children about obedience and independence to capture values toward an important aspect of child rearing. And the third attempts to hone in on values toward single parenting by evaluating people’s reactions to various parenting scenarios.
Lastly, three dimensions emerge under the domain of what might be construed as postmodern values. The first reflects people’s values toward the environment by assessing their willingness to contribute to the environmental cause. The second taps the extent to which people value quality of life by measuring the overall importance that friends and leisure play in their lives. And the third uses Inglehart’s [29] now standard four item battery to distinguish between materialist and postmaterialist values.
With this sample of 17 value orientations in hand, I then proceeded to assess whether greater economic development is associated with higher degrees of value diversity, focusing specifically in this analysis on the differences between younger and older generations. I began by comparing the frequency and size of inter-generational value differences across several agrarian, industrial and postindustrial states. On the whole, the findings suggest that there may in fact be a systematic pattern between inter-generational value diversity and economic development [Fig-1] .
For example, Figure 1a shows that there are clearly more value differences between generations in advanced industrial societies than in agrarian states. More specifically, the findings based on the 17 value dimensions that I compared suggest that the average number of significant value differences between younger post-1960s generations and older pre-1945 generations is more than two times greater (13) in postindustrial societies than in agrarian societies (5). In fact, these results suggest that younger and older generations in more developed societies share even fewer values in common (4) than differences (13). This also implies that the range of their value discrepancies in these postindustrial societies likely spans over multiple domains. Conversely, in less developed societies, the opposite is true. Younger and older generations in agrarian societies would appear to share more value similarities (12) than differences (5) and the range of those differences, as a consequence, is likely not nearly as extensive.
Add to this, the results reported in Figure 1b, which suggest that the average size of the inter-generational value discrepancies detected in advanced industrial states is also somewhat larger than those found in less developed states, although admittedly, the cross-national differences in this case are not nearly as striking. Still, what this finding may imply about the future is worthy of consideration. That is, not only do inter-generational value differences in more developed societies seem more predominant and varied, but they may also grow to become slightly more difficult to reconcile and bridge than those in less developed states. So, although this particular distinction may not seem all that significant today, it is certainly plausible that if the inter-generational value divide continues to expand, it may well become more difficult to manage over time.
Taken together, then, the bulk of the preceding evidence lends support to my claim suggesting that more developed societies may contain higher degrees of value diversity than less developed states. More specifically, the findings indicate that the degree of value diversity between younger and older generations, as measured by the average number and size of their value discrepancies across a range of different value orientations, is greater in more developed societies than in less developed states. Moreover, the comparable data from 34 different societies summarized in [Fig-2] also show that the correlation between GDP-PPP and value diversity attributable to inter-generational differences is also remarkably strong (r = .5) [Fig-2] .
The final aim of my analysis was to examine whether higher levels of value diversity in advanced industrial states are systematically linked to lower levels of support for political authorities. The evidence based on an examination of a mix of agrarian, industrial and postindustrial societies reported in [Table-2] suggests that there are a variety of explanations that likely provide empirically grounded accounts for cross-national variations in levels of support for people in government. However, the evidence also demonstrates that certain explanations may not be as relevant as others (Table 2).
The first important point to note is that political context clearly matters. And cross-nationally in particular, the degree to which its citizens are involved in the political process, plays a significant role in determining the extent to which they are likely to be openly critical of their political authorities. More specifically, what the findings of this analysis suggest is that when citizens are engaged in politics and participation is broad-based, they are more inclined to convey their dissatisfaction with people in government than citizens in more repressed and less participatory societies.
Moreover, consistent with what others have argued in the past [see for example, 11], this analysis also suggests that performance based arguments likely do not provide a very compelling account for cross-national variations in political support, at least not when they are tested at the aggregate or societal level of analysis. For example, the logic of performance based theories, as described by Dalton [11] and others, would lead us to expect that basic fluctuations in a country’s economic conditions, particularly if they directly affect people’s pocketbooks and alter their subjective sense of financial satisfaction, may result in deteriorations in political support. By the same token, Dalton also suggests that with repeated exposure to inadequate government performance, people may eventually develop a more acute sense of frustration or cynicism toward the workings and inadequacies of their political regime, which could also contribute to their negative orientations toward political authorities. Yet, according to this evidence, neither of these two possibilities is significantly associated with cross-national variations in support for people in government.
Notice however, that culture change theories seem to provide a much more relevant set of explanations for cross-national variations in political support. For example, there is evidence to support Putnam’s claim that declining interpersonal trust in advanced industrial states may have negative consequences for political support.
More specifically, the findings of this analysis demonstrate that societies with lower levels of interpersonal trust are systematically less likely to express satisfaction with people in government than more trusting societies. Moreover, this evidence also supports the claims made by modernization theorists, who suggest that declining levels of public satisfaction with government officials in advanced industrial states may be attributable to a growing body of more critical citizens and their declining respect for hierarchical authority structures [2,8] . That is, the evidence in Table 2 indicates that the less respecting societies are of authority, the less likely they are to support people in government.
Notice too, however, that even after accounting for each of the preceding arguments, the findings of this analysis indicate that value diversity may also be a significant determinant of cross-national differences in satisfaction with people in government. According to the results in [Table-2] , societies with higher degrees of inter-generational value differences have significantly lower levels of support for people in government than societies with less inter-generational value diversity. Furthermore, in relation to the other arguments examined in this analysis, the value diversity explanation has among the most noticeably robust effects.

One of the key findings from this analysis suggests that variations in political context constitute only one of a variety of important determinants of cross-national variations in political support, and that theories based on the economic development and culture change may be more relevant in this regard than theories relating to government or regime performance. For example, evidence indicates that cross-national differences in satisfaction with people in government are not significantly associated with variations in financial satisfaction, which we might assume to be an indirect, but relevant, reflection of a government’s record on economic performance. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that cross-national variations in support for people in government may be linked to the development of more cynical orientations toward overall regime performance, or the capacity of political regimes to work effectively.
Conversely, consistent with Putnam’s theory suggesting that it may be a development related inter-generational erosion of interpersonal trust that is partly to blame for lower levels of political support in advanced industrial states, the findings from this analysis demonstrate that societies with lower levels of interpersonal trust are less likely to be satisfied with people in government than those with higher levels of trust. Moreover, consistent with the claims made by modernization theorists about economic development and its negative effects on citizens’ capacities to tolerate hierarchical authority structures, the evidence from this investigation also indicates that societies with lower levels of respect for authority tend to be less supportive of people in government than those with more respect for authority.
Furthermore, a preliminary examination based on a extensive sample of 17 different value dimensions also suggests that the value mix in developed societies may be distinct from the value mix that exists in less developed societies. More specifically, the results of this investigation indicate that the degree of inter-generational value diversity in developed societies is much greater than in less developed states. In fact, what the findings of this analysis imply is that younger and older generations in more developed societies likely share even fewer values in common than differences, whereas in less developed states, the opposite is true. As a consequence, there are reasons to suppose that the range of inter-generational value discrepancies in more developed states may also be much broader than in less developed states. And there is even some basis to suggest that in the future, should inter-generational value differences continue to expand, they may be particularly difficult to reconcile in more developed states than in less developed societies.
Admittedly, there is much more detailed analysis that has yet to be done. Still, what the preliminary findings of this investigation suggest is that to the extent that people’s political demands are shaped by their values, greater value diversity may be contributing to the degree of intra-societal stress in advanced industrial states and further complicating the governing process. And this in turn may be negatively affecting political support. In fact, even after controlling for a variety of other prominent explanations, the results of this analysis indicate that value diversity has a significant net independent effect on satisfaction with people in government and that societies with higher degrees of inter-generational value differences have lower levels of support for people in government than societies with less value diversity. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is relatively quite robust.
The results of this study help to expand our overall understanding of the culture change argument and its implications for political support. More specifically, what the results in this investigation suggest is that in addition to factors such as citizens being less trusting of one another and less respectful of authority, the degree of value diversity in more developed societies is likely greater than in less developed states. This too may contribute to making governing in the former more complicated by making it more difficult to consider and respond to citizen demands and preferences, and fulfill their expectations.
In addition to continuing to further investigate the inter-generational value divide and its political implications, there are also several other questions that need to be expanded in the future. For example, are there any other new value divides that may also be contributing to the degree of intra-societal stress within advanced industrial states? Moreover, does the influence of new value divides vary cross-nationally? And, how does the relevance of new value divides compare to that of old cleavages based on social class, regional differences and religious divides? Also, are differences over certain values more critical than others? If so, which value differences are the most relevant? And are there any observable cross-national variations? Furthermore, what are the broader implications of these findings for social cohesion, the collective good and more diffuse levels of political support? This is a research direction that is challenging from both a methodological and conceptual perspective. However, the results of this analysis would seem to encourage further investigation and consideration that is more detailed.

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	Fig. 1- Inter-generational value diversity by type of society Note: The countries included in this analysis are: Agrarian sample: Bangladesh (n=3025), India (n=6542), South Africa (n=8671), Uganda (n=1002), Vietnam (n=995), Zimbabwe (n=1002) Industrial sample: Argentina (n=4366), Belarus (n=4107), Bulgaria (n=3106), Chile (n=3700), Croatia (n=2199), Estonia (n=3034), Hungary (n=4133), Latvia (n=3116), Lithuania (n=3027), Mexico (n=5430), Montenegro (n=1300), Philippines (n=2400), Portugal (n=1000), Russia (n= 6501), Serbia (n=2480), Ukraine (n=4006) Postindustrial sample: Belgium (n=4704), Britain (n=3577), Canada (n=4915), East Germany (n=3340), Finland (n=2613, France (n=2617), Germany (n=7499), Iceland (n=1670), Ireland (n=2012), Italy (n=6444), Japan (n=4613), North Ireland (n=1304), Netherlands (n=2020), Puerto Rico (n=1884), Spain (n=8870), United States (n=6906), West Germany (n=4155). Source: 1990-2000 World Values Surveys
	Fig. 2- Inter-generational value diversity by GDP-PPP per capita Note: The countries included in this analysis are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, the Netherlands, Puerto Rico, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Uganda, Ukraine, United States, Vietnam, Zimbabwe. Source: 1990-2000 World Values Surveys.
	Table 1- Factor Analysisa – The cross-national structure of value orientationsa
	Table 2- The determinants of satisfaction with people in government (regression analysis) Note: For operationalization and coding, see Appendix A. * significant at p<.05; ** significant at p<.01 a Each country is allocated a score from 0-10, where 10 means a high degree of participation. The countries included in this analysis and their political participation index score are as follows: Argentina (5.56), Bangladesh (4.44), Belarus (3.33), Bulgaria (6.67), Canada (7.78), Chile (5.00), Croatia (6.11), Estonia (5.00), Finland (7.78), Hungary (6.88), India (5.56), Japan (5.56), Latvia (6.11), Lithuania (6.67), Mexico (5.00), Montenegro (5.00), Philippines (5.00), Russia (5.56), South Africa (7.22), Serbia (5.00), Spain (6.11), Uganda (4.44), Ukraine (5.56), United States (7.22), Vietnam (2.78), Zimbabwe (3.89). Sources: 1990-2000 World Values Surveys; Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2007
	Table 3- Appendix A: Operationalization and coding