

A Simulation Study Comparing the Recital of RFID Protocols

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Abstract—RFID is a new technology that will become ubiquitous as RFID tags will be applied to every-day items in order to yield great productivity gains or “smart” applications for users. On the other hand, this pervasive use of RFID tags opens up the possibility for various attacks violating user privacy. Radio frequency identification (RFID) systems aim to identify tags to readers in an open environment where neither visual nor physical contact is needed for communication.

With the increased popularity of RFID applications, various authentication protocols have been proposed to provide security and privacy for RFID tags. In this paper we present a comprehensive survey of various authentication protocols in three perspectives, namely data protection, tracking protection, and forward security.

Keywords: RFID Tag, Authentication Protocols, Security.

I. INTRODUCTION

RFID stands for radio frequency identification. Radio frequency waves are the invisible signals that travel through the air and the walls of our homes to bring us music and news. Radio waves can be sent at different frequencies, like the different stations on the radio.

Because of their low production costs [1] and small size, RFID tags are expected to replace traditional identification methods such as bar codes. Currently, RFID tags are deployed, for instance, in passports [2], access control cards for public transportation [3], and location tracking systems [4, 5].

There are two basic types of RFID tags: Active tags and passive tags. Active tags contain miniature batteries that power the electronic circuit contained in the chip.

Passive tags carry no power of their own. Instead, they “capture” radio-frequency signals coming from the RFID reader, convert the signals into power, and then transmit the EPC code back to the RFID tag. While RFID tags operate as transponders, RFID readers act as transceivers [6].

Request

DATABASE <> RFID Tag> RFID Tags

Reader <.....Response

A. Basic RFID Communication Protocol

The communication is initiated by the RFID reader then it returns the reply to the database server. After

identification and authentication on the server side, then the server will return the information of RFID tag to the reader. Bandwidth for RFID communication systems is relatively low in several K bit per second. The bandwidth is more appropriate to perform scanning to all tags in the operation range of a reader within a short time.

Recently, low-cost tags have been found in logistics, point-of-sale checkouts, animal identification, item management in libraries, and waste management. In addition, more sophisticated RFID tags are used for higher value items in more complex applications such as ticketing, road toll, health care, electronic purse, key, anti-theft device and protection against counterfeiting. Therefore, it is predicted that RFID will be applied in many areas such as aviation, transportation, construction, clothing, health, and military.

1. Contributions

This study is aimed at comparing some low cost RFID authentication protocols in terms of three perspectives, data protection, tracking protection, forward security.

2. Organizations

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review RFID protocols addressing the scalability issue and Section 3 concludes the paper.

II. ANALYSIS ON RFID AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS

Here comparative study is done in terms of specific security and privacy they protect, basic security concept behind it. In addition all protocol then compared each other in the aspects of data protection, tracking prevention, and forward security.

A. One-Time Pad Based on XOR

[7].It requires a very simple XOR operation; therefore low computational cost for RFID is satisfied. A reader has the common list of randomly generated key for each tag. The reader and the tag find that both of them have the same key of the key list with several message exchanges between them.

Then the tag transmits its ID to the reader. This method needs several exchanges for authentication between the tag and the reader. Besides the common key list must be refreshed to guarantee the security.

B. External Re-Encryption Scheme

This method [8] uses public key cryptosystem. Tag data is re-encrypted when a user requires using the data transferred from an external unit. As public key encryption needs high computation cost, a tag cannot process for itself. This method has difficulty to frequently refresh each tag's data since the encrypted ID stored on tag is constant so that user location privacy is compromised.

C. Hash Chain Based Scheme


This operation is mainly applied as a simple mechanism to provide better protection of user privacy with the basic concept of refreshing the identifier of the tag each time it is queried by a reader. The protocol changes RFID identities on each read based on hash chains. This protocol is flawed to certain replay attacks which makes it difficult to guarantee forward security.

D. Blocker Tag

It is designed [9] to protect privacy that makes the tag unable to be used for theft, denials of service, and other malicious uses. It uses an individual tag, namely blocker tag for each tag and according to its purpose. To protect a tag's data, the blocker tag makes responses for attacker's request to get the tag's data. The responses from the blocker tag are not for the tag but all tags.


E. Extended Hash lock Scheme

Hash lock and extended hash lock are appropriate for low-cost RFID. It uses a backend server (to store keys k in its database), a reader and a tag. Each tag unique key with $metaID = h(k)$ as its key, where h is a hash function. The tag transmits $metaID$ as a response to a reader's query to the tag. Unfortunately this protocol fails to overcome eavesdrop attacks since $metaID$ is always constant which opens tracing problem.



In extended hash lock protocol provides a mechanism to overcome the tracing problem. In this

scheme a tag is introduced a tag with random number generator to randomize $metaID$ value. The tag picks pseudo random number r uniformly and calculates $c = hash(ID || jr)$ as the tag's unique identification for every session. The tag transmits its c and r to a back-end server by way of the reader. The server sends the unique identifier of the tag comparing c with r and all IDs that is stored in database of the server. But it is not fully satisfy data protection and forward security.



F. Hash-Based Varying Identifier

This adopts a hash function and a random number generator, but a pseudo random number is generated by a back-and server and transmitted to the tag for every interrogation to make the tag's queried identifier random and to preserve location privacy. A tag has only a unique identifier and remaining original data used for applications stored and controlled in a back-end database.

This protocol focus on securing location privacy problems by making a tag's ID randomized in every interrogation. The attacker is able to perform replay attack since forward security is not well provided.

G. Improved Hash-Based Varying Identifier

In this protocol the reader utilizes what is called a random number generator (RNG) to prevent the man-in-middle attack. In every query, the reader sends a pseudo-random number, S , to the tag. Then the tag replies $h(ID)$ for finding the record of a back-end server and half of a new identifier, $half(R)$. The scheme protects the location privacy as a tag's unique identifier is changed in every read attempts. This scheme is still vulnerable to the man-in-the middle attack particularly if there is no guarantee that the reader is a trusted party.

H. Mutual Authentication

The RFID reader and the tag carryout the authentication based on their synchronized secret information. It is monitored by a component of the database server. This protocol is claimed to have satisfied the low-cost requirement of RFID tags, it is highly dependable on back-end database which was confirmed as serious

limitation. Fully relying on a central database will create a single point of failure, opening up the entire RFID system to denial of service attacks.

It is confirmed that the protocol satisfied the requirements of both data protection and tracking prevention. It has certain limitation on forward security problems.

I. Ultra lightweight

It is proposed to deal with maintain security and privacy of RFID by using simple operations.

- Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol
- Minimalist Mutual Authentication Protocol.
- Efficient Mutual Authentication Protocol.

LAMP Protocol uses only 300 gates to provide security; the 96 bit key is divided into 4 which provides 4 messages, by which the reader sends A, B, C messages to the tag. However there are some risks regarding data. forgery and data fabrication during transfer.

M2AP employs 300 gates. The difference here is, addition of E value to add more Security in database authentication compared to LMAP [10].

EMAP is most efficient protocol among the above two. It uses only 150 gates provide Security of RFID It produce the XOR algorithm sigma value by which provide a more accurate way of authentication. It provides security within close ranges. All these protocols come with new weakness. The protocol is not robust since no assurance that the tag really recognized no matter whether the replying messages are indeed received and verified by a legitimate reader or not. As a result ultra lightweight protocols also do not provide full protection for forward security and location tracking.

TABLE: COMPARATIVE STUDY RESULT

Protocol	Tracking Protection	Data Privacy	Forward Security
One time Based on XOR	Satisfied	Partially Satisfied	Not Satisfied
External Re-Encryption Scheme	Partially Satisfied	Satisfied	Not Satisfied
Hash Chain Based Scheme	Satisfied	Satisfied	Not Available
Blocker Tag	Satisfied	Partially Satisfied	Satisfied
Extended Hash Lock Scheme	Satisfied	Partially Satisfied	Partially Satisfied
Hash Based Varying Identifier	Partially Satisfied	Satisfied	Not Satisfied
Improved Hash Based Varying Identifier	Satisfied	Satisfied	Not Satisfied
Mutual Authentication	Satisfied	Satisfied	Partially Satisfied
Ultra Weight	Partially Satisfied	Satisfied	Partially Satisfied

III. CONCLUSION

The low cost character is a very important reason for RFID mass implementation. Therefore , security and privacy are still inherent problems in RFID communications. These nine protocols address different security and privacy requirements through simple mathematical operations under low cost RFID.

This study focus on the analysis of determining how strong the protocols are in dealing with tracking protection, data privacy and forward security.

- Tracking Protection (A, C, D, E, G, H) show ability to satisfy.
- Data Privacy Requirements (B, C, F, G, Hand D) is fulfilled here.
- Forward Security (D) is satisfied here.

Finally, since there has been no single low cost RFID protocol capable to securing RFID from any attacks, economic consideration might also be applied in the future development of RFID protocol to define equilibrium of both security and low cost requirements.

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BIOGRAPHY

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